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 The relative balance of power between the United States and China is shifting. When 
China’s Dengist reforms propelled them towards greater prominence in the world economy, their 
consistently rapid growth caught the attention of the existing world powers. Now, several 
decades later and trillions of dollars wealthier, China finds itself engaged in a struggle for the 
title of world superpower. On the other side, the United States still vies for the position it has 
held since the end of the Second World War. While great power competitions are not a new 
phenomenon, they always have a profound impact on the global political and economic 
environment. Critically, such power competitions can result in a mass buildup of arms, including 
nuclear weapons. In such dyadic power struggles, how do states plan their next moves? 
Specifically, how do they respond to changes in their capabilities?  What appears most puzzling 
has been the absence of a Cold War style arms race (Such a style of arms race is characterized by 
massive expansions of nuclear arsenals and strategic capabilities) between the United States and 
China. While the rhetoric surrounding the rise of China has echoed that of the USSR, and 
America’s position on the world stage is almost equally threatened, there has not been a rapid 
buildup of arms by the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
 Often hegemonic struggles are accompanied by arms races, notable amongst these is the 
American-Soviet arms race of the mid 20th century, or the rapid naval buildup between Britain 
and Germany in the years preceding WWII. These arms races are costly, in terms of military 
expenditure and productive capacity that could better be used elsewhere. It appears since 1990 
the United States and China has been able to avoid such an arms race. In the United States, 
while the rhetoric surrounding the rise of China has echoed that of the USSR, and America’s 
position on the world stage is almost equally threatened, there has not been a rapid dyadic 
buildup of arms (both nuclear and conventional). In China, the past 30 years have been spent 
modernizing their military and preparing to challenge America on the world stage. This thesis 
thus asks, why have we not seen a dyadic arms race in the wake of China’s rise in global 
prominence and military capabilities? These are some of the questions this thesis illuminates.  
 
To address these questions, I first review the existing literature regarding arms races. I 
find the arms race literature can be thought of in four strands.  One such viewpoint on arms races 
sees them as either qualitative or quantitative in nature, and the phenomenon can be 
characterized by an increase in the number of weapons or an increase in the capabilities 
possessed by a nation’s armed forces. The second theoretical view of arms races holds that the 
occurrence need not necessarily be just one of the aforementioned categories, and instead is often 
multidimensional. According to this framework, arms races are often characterized by both 
increased in quality and quantity of weapons, though the order in which these different increases 
occur can have implications for the eventual outcome of the arms race. The third group of arms 
race literature holds a somewhat more nuanced view, and sees arms races as being caused by a 
variety of seven distinct rationales. Depending on which rationales are motivating the states 
involved in an arms race, the dynamics of the occurrence are affected. The final view on arms 
races holds that the phenomenon is actually a way in which states avoid conflict, and views arms 
races as an alternative to military conflict. To understand the conditions under which the existing 
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literature can be applied to the contemporary U.S.-China case I address just what type of case it 
represents. Drawing upon the case selection literature I argue U.S.-China relations since 1990 
can be considered an influential case. Here, I also address the materials used to assess U.S.-
Chinese the arms dynamic.  
 
Third, I find some support for the preexisting literature in the case of US-China. In brief, 
I argue that, since 1993, while the Chinese military has vastly expanded their capabilities and 
undergone various improvements both qualitative and quantitative in nature, America’s reactions 
have been late to respond to these advances in Chinese capabilities. While existing literature 
would lead one to believe that arms races are typically characterized by similar reactions on 
either side of the dyad, my research shows that China’s aggressive military expansion has not 
been immediately met by similar steps by America. This is notable as it defies the traditional 
rapid dyadic buildup of arms that are theorized to accompany such arms races. The reasoning for 
the delayed response on the part of America is not so simple. However, my findings illustrate a 
sort of unequal two-way threat perception. The United States has long perceived China as a 
growing threat due to their rapidly expanding economy and growing prominence on the world 
stage. China, on the other hand, has long felt uneasy at the proximity America’s armed forces 
have to their mainland, the American military’s technological advancement, and the willingness 
of America and her allies to utilize military power to neutralize nations that were seen as a threat 
by Western countries even in regions not directly adjacent to them. However, it is clear that 
China’s perception of America as their primary threat on the world stage has lasted longer than 
America’s perception of China as such. While America has, in recent years, changed their 
trajectory in this aspect, the nature of their adaptations has been fundamentally different than 
China’s.  
 
 Having a comprehensive understanding on the ways in which arms races occur and the 
ways in which these two states confront each other is important for policymakers and academics 
alike. In the policy realm, being able to better anticipate the adaptations your opponent may 
undertake can help inform smart decisions on behalf of those seeking to preemptively negate or 
confront them. A policymaker working on issues pertinent to national security, for example, 
would benefit from having a greater understanding of the strategic dynamics at play when 
looking to present a solution for a conflict. Academics, on the other hand, may benefit from 
learning how existing literature on international relations and arms races has and has not fit into 
real world examples. Seeing how and why China and America strategically adapt to each other is 
sure to provide solid answers to existing questions within international relations and political 
science scholarship. In particular, my findings seek to showcase the consequences of the 
strategic advances and adaptations and how they arise. My thesis will showcase how states will 
undergo such changes if they feel that their opponents’ position or capabilities poses a threat to 
their strategic positioning. Additionally, I will elaborate on what exactly has caused these states 
to view their strategic positions as potentially compromised, and how they have attempted to 
rectify such situations. Additionally, I will provide information regarding the potential 
consequences for not responding to strategic adaptations, and why sometimes non-response can 
be a viable path.  
 




  There exist a multitude of perspectives on arms races, with each highlighting distinct 
causes and consequences of the phenomenon. While some perspectives view arms races as 
preceding conflict, others may see the dynamic as a way for states to flex their military might 
without going to war. Additionally, some views on arms races may hold that states undergo 
buildups in military might for a variety of different reasons, with each rationale for engaging in 
arms races leading to different characteristics of the phenomenon. Different groups of scholars 
have varying views on arms races and their underlying causes and consequences. There are well 
defined subsets of theories on arms races, and many of the differences between these views on 
arms races have to do with the ways in which arms races are measured and observed. While 
many scholars take a more quantitative approach towards research and measure arms races by a 
series of arms buildups, others believe that the dynamics underlying these events are not as 
simply measured by an overall increase in weapons capacity and may be better suited to a more 
qualitative analysis. Other perspectives on arms races go more in depth as to their root causes, 
and the enduring dyadic series of actions that these may cause. In this section, I will define 
several different main theoretical perspectives on arms races and elaborate upon each of them. 
After reviewing the literature on arms races, I will then analyze the relationship between the 
United States and China over the past three decades and assess the validity of the existing 
theoretical frameworks.  
 
Prior to discussing the various bodies of theoretical literature on arms races, it is 
necessary to define what exactly an arms race is. One of the first known observations of arms 
races was by the Sir Edward Grey, former British Secretary of War from 1905-1916. Based on is 
time in office, Grey grew aware of the various effects that a rapid buildup in arms has on 
relations between states. In 1914 Grey claimed, “Great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there 
are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on the other sides. While one nation arms, 
other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenseless…Each measure taken by 
one nation is noted and leads to counter measures by others…”1 While this quote certainly 
describes the phenomenon, it does not technically define it. Huntington (1958) defines an arms 
race as, “a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states…resulting 
from conflicting purposes and mutual fears.” Bull (1961) gives a similar answer, classifying an 
arms race as, “intense competition between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to 
achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its 
armaments or armed forces.” It is apparent from these definitions that arms races must be 
undertaken by two opposing nations (as in, two friendly nations increasing arms would not be 
classified as an arms race). Additionally, there is some sort of rationale behind their actions. In 
Huntington’s definition he posits the presence of conflicting purposes or mutual fears as 
motivating factors behind the buildup of arms. In Bull’s case, it is the pursuit of an advantage 
over a competitor. Either way, it is clear that an arms race is also not a result of random chance, 




1 Mitchell, David F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2018. "Arms Buildups and the Use of Military Force." In Cameron G. 




One dichotomous perspective on arms races is that which divides them into the categories 
of quantitative and qualitative arms races. Quantitative arms races are characterized by increases 
in the total number of weapons or equipment of a state. Accordingly, qualitative arms races are 
those in which states continuously improve the quality of their materiel or strategic capabilities, 
without increasing the total amount of such items in their inventory. While these differ in the 
fashion in which nations undergo military improvements, it is important to note that many 
theorize that these two different types of arms races are likely to have far different outcomes.  
 
Quantitative arms races have implications for war onset. S.P. Huntington (1958) claims 
that quantitative arms races are more likely to result in the outbreak of war, due to the 
burdensome financial nature of such an arms race incentivizing a nation to increase hostility 
towards another state in order to generate public support. Such a dynamic theoretically pushes 
nations towards the point where they must come to a decision, either end the state of affairs via 
treaty or war.2  
 
Qualitative arms races may have the opposite effect, whereas a series of corresponding 
increases in weapon quality and capabilities make the prospect of war less likely. A real-world 
example of this dynamic in action is the enduring peace of the nuclear age, according to 
proponents of this view. Given that the introduction of such an advanced and destructive 
capability, nations have avoided war due to the potential costs associated with near-worldwide 
destruction. This is for several reasons, first among them is the fact that a qualitive arms race 
does not necessarily require the same level of expenditures as a quantitative arms race, thus 
reducing the effects that Huntington theorizes arise from the dynamics of an expensive arms 
race.3 Additionally, there is also the possibility that nations fear losing extremely expensive and 
scarce, but advanced, equipment, which in turn deters them from using it. Another important 
aspect of arms races that Huntington noted was their potential multidimensionality, with states 
often alternating between quantitative and qualitative approaches. However, according to 
Huntington if a state engaged in a qualitative arms race changes their approach to a quantitative 
one, then it is fair to assume that they are preparing for conflict.4 While the dichotomy between 
qualitative and quantitative arms races is important to understand, it should also be noted that 
Huntington drew attention to the fact that arms races can be multidimensional (as in, fluctuate 
between qualitative and quantitative types). The theoretical distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative arms races is important to grasp, as it allows observers to acknowledge the presence 
of a dyadic increase in strategic capabilities between nations without having to rely on more 
simplistic variables as observational points such as total number of warships, tanks, or aircraft.  
 
 
2 Mitchell, David F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2018. "Arms Buildups and the Use of Military Force." In Cameron G. 
Thies, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, Page 
62. 
 
3 Mitchell, David F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2018. "Arms Buildups and the Use of Military Force." In Cameron G. 
Thies, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, Pages 
62-63. 
 
4 Huntington, Samuel P. “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results.” Public Policy 8 (1958): 41–860.  
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The view that arms races may be divided between qualitative and quantitative versions is 
useful when attempting to categorize or explain a certain arms race. However, such a simple 
categorization may fall victim to the same issues mentioned regarding splitting the views on 
arms races into arms-using and arms-building models; that being, a strict dichotomous 
distinction runs the risk of oversimplifying a given scenario. That being said, the aforementioned 
potential multidimensionality of an arms race within the qualitative/quantitative literature allows 
us to view arms races with a greater level of nuance than that which would be afforded by purely 
analyzing a scenario as falling into one of two categories. Additionally, while this perspective 
does a good job at outlining the characteristics and potential courses of action for the two types 
of arms races, it does not elaborate on the causes of such occurrences or the variables that 
compel nations to engage in arms races. As such, it seems appropriate that the strict 
qualitative/quantitative arms race perspective not be the sole framework through which to view a 
given arms race, and while the literature on this subject does paint a good picture of the 
characteristics of arms races, it is important to combine such a perspective with other existing 
theoretical frameworks in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of a given case. 
 
A somewhat less popular, but still intriguing, viewpoint on arms races is that of their use as 
conflict deterrent behaviors. Such a perspective was initially put forward by J.C. Lambelet 
(1975), who noted that while the periods immediately preceding WWI and II were characterized 
by a rapid arms buildup by both Allied and Axis nations, the Korean War started right at the end 
of a unilateral disarmament process. Thus, it can be theorized that war may not have occurred 
had the United States either increased or at least did not reduce the amount of power it had 
relative to the other side.5 In Lambelet’s view, there can exist a relationship between arms races 
and the outbreak of war that would see the former prevent the latter. Accordingly, states may 
rapidly increase their military’s size and capabilities in order to deter the enemy from taking 
hostile action. However, while this perspective offers a unique view on the rationale behind 
starting the amassing of arms, it does not address the inherent dyadic relationship that is seen so 
often between states engaged in an arms race.  
While this perspective is definitely interesting, the lack of evidence behind Lambelet’s 
claims makes it a difficult view to consider mainstream. While the Korean War did begin at the 
end of a unilateral disarmament process, it is important to note that there were a myriad of 
factors affecting the outbreak of the war. Ongoing inter-Korean tensions as well as the shift 
towards a capitalist vs. communist global struggle in the wake of WWII were both important 
events to keep in mind6. However, while the one case brought to bear in the theoretical texts is 
less than convincing, the logic behind the view seems coherent. It does not seem unreasonable 
that a state would increase its military’s size and capabilities as a form of posturing in order to 
deter their enemies.  
 
5Lambelet, John C. "Do Arms Races Lead to War?" Journal of Peace Research 12, no. 2 (1975): 123-28. Accessed April 
25, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/423156. 
 
6 Stueck, William. The Korean War : An International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Accessed April 26, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
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 Other perspectives on arms races don’t simply divide the occurrence into two distinct 
categories. Instead, some theorists highlight various different reasons for why states engage in an 
arms race, and do not simply seek to focus on the characteristics of the arms race itself as the 
sole determinant of its categorization. Indeed, the reason for a state engaging in an arms race 
may also have an effect on the characteristics of it. For example, states that feel threatened and in 
need of greater security may be more brazen in their acquisition of arms. Contrarily, states that 
seek to increase their national prestige for both external and internal political dynamics may be 
more secretive about their militaries until it is politically advantageous to reveal their capabilities 
(such was the case with Nazi Germany in the prelude to WWII, as their rapid expansion of their 
military was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles). Colin S. Gray, in his writing “The Urge to 
Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing,” lays out seven basic foundational reasonings for why 
arms races may occur. Each of these rationales seeks to explain the dynamics behind arms races 
and why states may partake in them.  
 
The first of Gray’s explanations is that of deterrence, in which a state will seek to 
discourage potential conflict by ensuring that any opponent would suffer excessive losses in the 
case of conflict. The deterrence rationale operates under the assumption that states act rationally 
and would be likely to preemptively calculate the risks of conflict. Proponents of this rationale 
often point to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race as evidence of its prominence. Indeed, this exact 
reasoning was espoused by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who once remarked, 
“In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-
fifth to one-fourth of her population would serve as an effective deterrent. Such a level of 
destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th-Century industrial 
nation.”7.  
 
The second rationale Gray mentions is defense, in which a state will undergo an arms 
race in order to attain a more favorable outcome in case of conflict. The central question behind 
this rationale is to what degree wars and the threat of wars precipitate and sustain arms races8. 
However, as many scholars would agree, a necessary perspective for studying the competition in 
armament manufacturing is that is possible for wars to occur and that (possibly only in part) is 
what drives nations to undergo arms races.  
 
Gray’s third rationale is diplomacy, which claims that states may engage in arms races in 
order to increase its diplomatic influence. The reasoning behind the diplomacy outlook holds that 
a state’s armed forces may influence foreign policy by virtue of their coercive potential, and that 
a prime function of a nation’s military is to exert influence and provide beneficial change in the 
calculus of an adversary9. Additionally, there is also the consideration that a state’s strategic 
capabilities affect that state’s political perception, and that states with greater capabilities are 
 
7 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): Page 
210. Web. 
 
8 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): Page 
211. Web. 
9 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): Page 
215. Web. 
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afforded a sense of prestige on the world stage. Overall, the diplomatic rationale views arms 
races as “exercises in symbolic politics” in the words of Colin Gray.  
 
The fourth rationale is the perception of a functional threat. For this interpretation, most 
of the focus is on bureaucratic processes and politics, in which domestic institutions seeking to 
maximize their budget and influence utilize the functional hostility of an external rival10. 
According to the proponents of this reasoning, a nation’s armed forces pick and choose specific 
targets based on existing characteristics (such as a target nation’s overall military size) and paint 
them as possible threats in order to ensure that proper budgetary consideration is paid to the 
department that can counter such a threat.  
 
The fifth rationale is vested interests, which holds that a state may engage in an arms race 
because its domestic bureaucracy is held captive by industrial and legislative interests which all 
share in the spoils of increased defense spending11.  
 
Next is the viewpoint of reputation as the driver behind an arms race. In this case, a state 
would improve their strategic capabilities or increase the number of arms in order to preserve or 
enhance what it perceives as an appropriate level of prestige. Under this rationale, it is presumed 
that war is not an anticipated end to the arms buildup. Instead, a state’s military may also fulfill 
the purpose of setting a reputation in the eyes of others12. Such has often been suspected as the 
case with more despotic nations spending large sums of money relative to their overall 
economies on defense budgets.  
 
The seventh and final rationale that Gray writes about is that of technology. According to 
this line of reasoning, a state may engage in an arms race because it fears that their existing 
military technology may not be sufficient to counter an enemy’s anymore. States would be 
compelled to continually develop more technologically advanced strategic capabilities in order to 
offset those held by its enemy13.  
 
Colin Gray’s categorization of the various rationales behind arms race analysis does not 
settle on one specific framework as inherently more correct than any of the others. While each 
may have its shortcomings and advantages, each rationale can be used to explain different arms 
race scenarios and the factors that influence them. Additionally, a multitude of rationales could 
apply for a specific case. For example, it is possible that a state engages in an arms race due to 
both internal domestic pressure from industry groups, and that certain bureaucratic decision 
 
10 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): 
Page 216. Web. 
 
11 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): 
Page 219. Web. 
 
12 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): 
Page 224. Web. 
 
13 Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics 26, no. 2 (January 1974): 
Page 227. Web. 
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makers have highlighted functional threats in order to increase budgetary considerations to their 
agencies.  
 
The seven distinct rationales posited by Gray allow for a very nuanced view on the 
causes of various arms races. Additionally, a given arms race may be caused by a combination of 
several of these rationales. This perspective provides a very elaborate framework through which 
to evaluate what exactly compels a nation to engage in an arms race, and how such an arms race 
may play out. The fact that this theoretical outlook does not fall victim to the simplistic 
dichotomous categorization that other works of literature on arms races do may allow a more 
comprehensive and detailed look at the root causes behind an arms race. As such, the 
aforementioned seven distinct rationales provide a useful starting point for a very nuanced look 
into arms races. That being said, this does not mean that the literature that takes a dichotomous 
route towards categorizing arms races should be thrown to the wayside; indeed, there is a use for 
them when analyzing an arms race. Additionally, their popularity as foundational theoretical 
texts on arms race literature makes them important benchmarks to evaluate a real-world case 
against.  
 
Theoretical perspectives and outcomes for arms races 
 
Perspective Expected Outcome in U.S.-China Case 
Quantitative arms race (Moll, Leubbert)  Both nations will continuously pursue qualitative 
advantages over the other in the form of 
advanced weapons and capabilities. Possibly 
reduce the chance of conflict.  
Quantitative arms race (Moll, Leubbert) Both nations amass arms in greater numbers, 
seeking to gain a quantitative advantage over the 
other. Possibly increase the chance of conflict. 
Multidimensional (Huntington) A shift from a qualitative to a quantitative is 
likely to signal preparation for conflict. 
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“Seven rationales” (Gray) The dynamics of the arms race will play out in 
accordance with whichever of the seven 
rationales are motivating a country to engage in 
an arms race.  
“Arms races decrease chance of conflict” 
(Lambelet) 
An arms race is likely to reduce the chance of 







 The U.S.-China arms race, or lack thereof, can provide valuable insight on existing 
conceptions of hegemonic struggles and the upgrades in strategic capabilities that go along with 
it (additionally, this case may provide information on arms races in general, even those that do 
not include nuclear armed states as part of the dyad). America’s status as the current world 
superpower, and China’s strides towards greater global prominence both diplomatically and 
militarily, makes this arms race a particularly useful case study on the subject. 
 
The U.S.-China relationship over the past thirty years has been the only other great power 
struggle outside of US-USSR that has happened after the creation of nuclear weapons. As the 
existence of nuclear weapons has drastically altered scholars’ views on arms races since the end 
of the Second World War14, this case can provide insights as to how existing literature on the 
subject can be cross referenced with existing cases. Seeing how China and America’s strategic 
capabilities have changed, and how that fits into existing literature on arms races between 
nuclear armed superpowers, can provide valuable insight into how existing notions of arms races 
and dyadic weapons buildups are undertaken in a global power struggle.  
 
The fact that the findings of this case may be used to check existing assumptions on arms 
race literature regarding great power competitions, it can be said that the U.S-China arms race 
that is being examined fits the description of an influential case. Influential cases, in short, are 
chosen due to the need to check the assumptions behind some general model of causal 
 
14 Mitchell, David F., and Jeffrey Pickering. 2018. "Arms Buildups and the Use of Military Force." In Cameron G. 




relations.15 The general models that are to be assessed in this case is the existing literature on 
arms races, particularly those concerning arms races between two hegemonic powers with 
nuclear weapons. There are two main objectives for case selection that I believe this case meets, 
with these two objectives being that the case is a representative sample, and that there are useful 
variations on the dimensions of theoretical interest.16 For the issue of the case being a 
representative sample, I believe that this is as close as one can get to a representative sample for 
a nuclear armed great power arms race. As there has only ever existed one such arms race, it is 
hard to definitively determine whether or not such a case is truly representative. That being said, 
there are several reasons why I believe that the U.S.-China arms race is a representative sample 
for the subject being examined. First among these is the fact that existing literature on non-
nuclear armed great power arms races can still provide useful insight on the subject at hand. The 
fact that the U.S.-China arms race is between nuclear armed powers does not entirely preclude 
the usage of non-nuclear related arms race case studies in the analysis, though special attention 
should be paid to the impacts the presence of nuclear weapons has on the issue at hand.  
 
Additionally, the wealth of existing scholarship on the American and Soviet dyadic arms 
race incorporates a multitude of viewpoints and perspectives, so even though there exists only 
one case that is similar in both size and presence of nuclear weapons, the abundance of differing 
theories on the principles that underlie the issue means that many different comparisons can be 
drawn between the two cases depending on which theories we engage with.  
 
The analysis of the U.S.-China arms race also need not necessarily view the presence of 
nuclear arms as a defining feature of the issue at hand. While the U.S.-Soviet arms race was 
characterized by both sides amassing both nuclear and conventional arms, the aforementioned 
absence of such a phenomenon occurring in the case at hand may lend credence to the view that 
the presence of nuclear weapons in an arms race may not be as defining a feature in this case as it 
was in the Cold War. This may be due to a variety of reasons, such as the existence of 
international arms control treaties and greater anti-ballistic missile capabilities. It is of no debate 
that in the past three decades both America and China have engaged in far less nuclear posturing 
than occurred in the Cold War. While many theorists postulate that the presence of nuclear arms 
has an intrinsic effect on the dynamic of arms races, the impact that they have on this case seems 
to be considerably milder than in the case of the U.S.-USSR arms race. Because of this, the fact 
that the case at hand examines an arms race between a rising and existing nuclear armed 
hegemonic power does not automatically exclude non-nuclear arms races from being cross 
examined in the literature, nor their defining features not potentially showing up here. As such, 
the U.S.-China arms race may be used as an influential case to examine the breadth of existing 




15 John Gerring and Jason Seawright, “Case Selection for Case‐Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Techniques,” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.003.0028. 
 
16 John Gerring and Jason Seawright, “Case Selection for Case‐Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Techniques,” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.003.0028. 
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The sources which support the findings come mostly from American government documents 
that are meant to assess either American or Chinese military power. Additional source material 
includes academic journal articles (for the theoretically focused literature), reports related to 
national security matters compiled by third party sources, and a variety of government 
documents that go over issues such as national strategy. The opaque nature of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and the strict censorship laws in China, mean that there are not many primary 
sources on Chinese military capability and strategy. Additionally, the language barrier means 
that one must rely on translated texts, assuming they do not know Mandarin. While this makes 
pinpointing exact capabilities and statistics for the PLA difficult, we can say with a good degree 
of certainty that what is being reported in U.S. government documents (and corroborated by third 
party reports) is accurate enough to paint a relatively clear picture of the PRC’s military might. 
Overall, the sources from which data was collected were mostly government-published 
assessments of strategies and capabilities, with some additional sources coming from non-







 While the two nations view each other as adversarial competitors on the world stage, the 
relationship between America and China’s military advancements has not exactly followed a 
dynamic that would be expected between parties engaged in a great power competition. While 
the Chinese government has spent the past thirty years adapting their military to better counter 
America and other advanced nations, the United States has not undergone a similar adaptation of 
their forces in order to better counter the threat posed by China. Such a pattern of behaviors 
generally defies the existing literature on arms races, as aside from the absence of a dyadic 
response in military buildup, the mere act of China rapidly expanding their military capabilities 
to counter America’s would generally have been expected to evoke a similar response.  
 
 In order to gain a comprehensive view on the various steps each nation has taken, and 
how they may be related, it is important to start from the beginning of the studied time frame and 
explain what events have acted as a catalyst for escalation. Particularly, what compelled China to 
start a massive modernization of their armed forces? Interestingly enough, China’s large shift in 
military strategy and capabilities was primarily influenced by the 1990 Gulf War. After seeing 
what was then the world’s fourth largest military succumb to waves coordinated coalition 
airstrikes, the Chinese government realized that in order to stave off potential defeat against a 
modern adversary (particularly America and their allies), a series of massive improvements must 
be made to the Chinese military. That being said, these changes were not immediately 
implemented. Taylor Fravel (2019) explains how in order for the Chinese military to undergo 
massive changes, internal political unity must occur. In this case, the ensuing political fallout 
from the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 meant that political unity would not be achieved 
until October of 1992 at the Fourteenth Party Congress. It was not until early 1993 that the 
changes were officially underway. With these conditions met, China began their ninth major 
change in military strategy since the nation’s founding in 1949. This time, China was preparing 
for what they referred to as “Local wars under high-technology conditions”. While the 
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overarching strategy has not been greatly altered since 1993, two smaller changes in 2004 and 
2014 are also of note due to the increased emphasis on information sharing and high-tech 
military equipment, along with force structure changes that were meant to increase the integrated 
joint operational capabilities of the PLA17.  
 
 The shift towards a more technologically capable military on the part of China was, as 
shown, primarily driven by their fear of capabilities that America possessed going into the Gulf 
War. The fact that China would begin to acquire new military capabilities due to fears of 
technological inferiority can be seen as an example of one of Gray’s (1974) rationales in effect, 
this time the rationale of technology as a motivator for an arms race. The rationale of defense can 
also be thought to contribute to China’s efforts to obtain greater multi-domain and high-
technology military capabilities, as they realized their importance in case of conflict with an 
advanced nation. 
 
 In addition to their altered strategy and increased emphasis on information as a key 
element in conflict, the Chinese military has also acquired a host of advanced weapons systems 
over the past thirty years. While the PLA still fields a sizeable amount of ex-soviet equipment 
(including Chinese made weapons and vehicles that are copies of their Russian counterparts), 
there has been massive effort undertaken by the Chinese government in order to bolster 
indigenous weapons production. Perhaps nowhere is this trend more obvious than China’s naval 
advancement. The PLAN has transformed from a moderately capable brown-water navy into a 
modern and powerful blue-water fleet. The man most responsible for this trend is formal 
Admiral Wu Shengli (head of the PLAN until 2017), who expressed the need for China to build a 
powerful navy in order to protect China’s access to ocean routes18. Dozens of modern warships 
have been built in and acquired by China. Construction of these vessels has primarily centered 
around China’s large shipbuilding yards in the Bohai Sea, particularly in the city of Dalian. It 
was there that China’s most capable warships have been assembled, giving the PLAN greater 
force-projection capabilities farther away from their shores.  
 
 The majority of China’s naval modernization has focused on three distinct fields, these 
being anti-surface warfare, naval air defense, and force projection. A report by the Office of 
Naval Intelligence lays out the ways in which China has expanded these capabilities: 
- Anti-Surface Warfare: The PLA(N) has more than quadrupled the number of submarines 
capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), installed missiles with longer ranges 
and more sophisticated guidance packages on its surface combatants, built over 50 high- 
speed ASCM-carrying patrol craft, and developed the world's only anti-ship ballistic 
missile.  
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- Naval Air Defense: Historically a weak area for the PLA(N), its newest combatants now 
feature mid and long-range surface-to-air missiles, and the Luyang II DDG possesses a 
sophisticated phased-array radar system similar to the western AEGIS radar.  
- Force Projection: China has increased its underway replenishment capability by 67 
percent, allowing greater sustainment of operations far from shore. China has also 
constructed a large amphibious ship (Yuzhao LPD) and a hospital ship (Anwei AH), 
which could be used either for humanitarian relief missions or support to amphibious 
combat. Finally, China is refurbishing an aircraft carrier bought from Ukraine and plans 
to build its own within the next five to ten years.19 
It is important to note that the information provided in the last point is somewhat outdated. 
China currently has two aircraft carriers (the Shandong and Liaoning) both based off of the older 
Soviet Kuznetzov class, with plans for new ones of an indigenous design. Additionally, the 
PLAN has drastically increased its amphibious capabilities, and the recent launch of the Type 
075 LHD has given China a modern amphibious assault craft. Currently, China’s naval aviation 
capabilities are far from matching America’s; that being said, they are increasing at a much faster 
rate. More naval aviation capabilities would allow for China to position air assets farther away 
from shore, which is particularly useful for force projection. Of course, these three fields are not 
the entirety of China’s naval modernization efforts; however, they are the areas that are most 
threatening to U.S. assets in the region. 
 
The presence of anti-ship ballistic missiles has been of much concern to American officials 
for years. The weapons system, known as the DF-21 and DF-26, gives China the ability to strike 
an American carrier strike group from the Chinese mainland, potentially thousands of miles 
away. The introduction of these weapons systems into the Pacific theater may complicate 
America’s presence in the area in the case of conflict. The DF-21 and DF-26 missiles’ long 
ranges can potentially thwart a U.S. fleet coming to the aid of Taiwan in the case of a 
hypothetical Chinese invasion, ensuring that America’s floating airfields are forced to stay far 
away from the contested island. Current estimates of the range of China’s ASBMs are around 
4,000 kilometers, which would mean that in order to ensure a carrier strike group is out of range 
of these weapons, they would have to be far from the South China Sea. Additionally, China 
seeks further improvements to their anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities by means of a 
hypersonic glide vessel to deliver a payload20. The development of such anti-ship ballistic 
missiles is unmistakably a qualitative improvement in arms specifically oriented at countering 
America’s reliance on naval force projection. Possessing such a capability is sure to give China a 
more powerful option to neutralize American aircraft carriers than any other country currently 
has. The implications for this are deep, as America has traditionally relied on their naval force 
projection as their most powerful conventional military capability. The development of such 
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potent anti-ship ballistic missiles should come as no surprise to those who have studied U.S.-
China relations.  
 
The PRC has long been wary of America’s force-projection capabilities in the pacific. The 
genesis for such concerns is said to be the 1996 Taiwan Straits incident, in which America sailed 
aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese aggression towards the island 
nation. As Cortez A. Cooper III, a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, 
notes on the incident, “The 1995-96 crisis forced China’s leadership to confront the fact that 
there was little to nothing they could do to stop the U.S. from coming to Taiwan’s assistance 
with U.S. forces”21. With the advent of long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, China has finally 
achieved the capability to prevent such an incident from occurring again. Such a development 
not only spells trouble for American forces in the region, but for Taiwan as well. It can be argued 
that China acquiring new capabilities to deter America’s presence in the region and ensure a 
greater position of relative power is an example of diplomacy and deterrence as rationales for 
arms races, as theorized by Gray (1974). The fact that such a capability was acquired in order to 
influence the calculus America would use to determine their actions in the region lends 
credibility to the idea. Ensuring that America feels their navy is in a hostile environment while 
conducting operations in the Indo-Pacific region would also deter their presence in case of 




A map with various estimates of the ranges of China’s missiles, of note is the range of the DF-26 multi-role 
IRBM, which has the ability to strike moving ships. Source: Department of Defense 
 
 While it seems obvious that China’s navy has undergone massive qualitative 
improvements, it should also be noted that their overall fleet size has drastically increased in 
recent years as well. Aside from merely constructing improved naval assets, China has amassed 
 




what is now believed to be the world’s largest navy22. The PLAN is currently estimated to have 
360 ships in its command, compared to America’s 297. What is even more concerning for some 
analysts is that China’s entire navy is based in the Pacific Ocean, whereas America’s navy is 
spread out over a variety of global regions where America seeks to project force. While the total 
number of ships is not the sole determinant of which navy is better equipped, the fact that China 
has amassed such a large fleet shows that their military improvements have not purely been 
qualitative in nature. That being said, many of the PLAN’s ships are outdated Soviet-bought 
hulls, so looking at the total number of ships in their fleet may be misleading. Still, the rate at 
which China is producing modern vessels to replace their older ships is higher than any other 
nation at the time, especially America, and it is beyond doubt that China possesses a far greater 
industrial shipbuilding capacity than the United States.  
 
 
A table showing the total number of Chinese Navy ships since 2005, divided by type. Source: Congressional 
Resource Service 
 
 While much emphasis has been put on analyzing the PLAN’s naval capabilities with 
regards to their ships, it is also important to note the various advances in naval aviation than were 
undertaken by the Chinese in order to modernize their navy. These changes have primarily 
centered around carrier-based aircraft, anti-submarine warfare aircraft, and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. China’s current carrier-based fighter of choice is 
the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, a native-built version of the Russian Su-33 Flanker. However, 
there are current plans to replace the aging airframe with a new, indigenous design. This will 
likely be based on either China’s J-20 or FC-31 stealth fighters; however, the program is in its 
early stages. Additionally, China has recently developed their own carrier-based airborne early 
warning (AEW) platform, known as the KJ-600. This gives China a sea-based airborne radar 
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similar in nature to the American E-2 Hawkeye, allowing the PLAN to have long-range radar 
capabilities while on maritime deployment23. Such a platform would give the PLAN the ability 
to scan and track targets potentially hundreds of miles away and relay the information back to 
naval and air assets. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has also invested in newer land-based 
maritime patrol aircraft meant to match the surveillance capabilities of advanced militaries. The 
KJ-500 and KJ-200 AEW aircraft have both been introduced relatively recently into Chinese 
service, giving the PLAN a more advanced and capable maritime patrol and observation 
platform. The fact that the PLAN has invested so much into high-tech naval aviation capabilities 
is in line with their overall plan to modernize their armed forces. Additionally, acquiring these 
capabilities has now given China the ability to better conduct long-rang maritime ISR missions, 
allowing them to detect and analyze targets far beyond their own territory.  
 
 The PLAN is far from the only branch of China’s military that has undergone massive 
changes over the past thirty years. The People’s Liberation Army has actually drastically 
downsized since the drastic military shift in 1993. As a result of China’s changes in force 
structure and capabilities, the PLA shrank by 18.6% (roughly half a million troops). This was 
due to a focus on “streamlining and organization”, which sought to reform the Chinese military 
into a fighting force that was better optimized for high-technology warfare24. Such a drastic 
downsizing of China’s army is evidence of their 1993 modernization efforts being primarily 
centered on qualitative improvements rather than quantitative ones. Additionally, downsizing 
was not the only change that the PLA undertook. A massive shift away from an infantry 
dominated army towards one that puts greater emphasis on combined arms combat was also 
successfully pursued. This has had the effect of transforming the PLA into a more dynamic 
fighting force with a breadth of modern high-technology capabilities. Despite the downsizing 
and streamlining of the PLA, they are still recognized as the largest standing army on earth. And 
considering that their current force structure is far more multi-domain and integrated, their 
combat capabilities are estimated by many analysts to be on a near-peer level with the United 
States. The fact that China has downsized the total manpower of their armed forces supports the 
view that their military modernization efforts have been primarily qualitative in nature. Despite 
the aforementioned increase in number of ships, one can argue that their acquisition is mainly to 
acquire the capability of force projection, and not merely a case of them attempting to outnumber 
their adversaries. That being said, the fact that there have been both qualitative increases (in the 
case of capabilities) and quantitative increases (in the case of certain materiel) fits Huntington’s 
(1958) view on the multidimensionality of arms races.  
 
 The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has also undergone drastic changes in 
the past thirty years, although there is still much that could use improvement. Throughout the 
majority of the 20th century the PLAAF mostly operated license-built Soviet designs, with only a 
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few instances of indigenous designs being put into service. It was not until relatively recently 
that China’s aviation industry became well-established enough to have the capability to develop 
and manufacture advanced fighter aircraft. Even then, many of their aircraft are claimed to have 
been designed from stolen intellectual property. Additionally, China has been investing in 
advanced aviation combat capabilities such as drones and increasingly sophisticated electronic 
warfare aircraft25. While these added capabilities put China on a path towards a truly modern air 
force capable of joint operations and high-technology warfare, there are still key capabilities they 
lack. Most notable amongst these is an advanced strategic bomber force. The PLAAF currently 
fields the Xian H-6 as their only strategic bomber, which is license-built version of the Soviet 
Tupolev Tu-16, an aircraft first flown in 1952. The outdatedness of the H-6 leaves it vulnerable 
to modern air defenses, and it is thus relegated to stand-off cruise missile firing and 
reconnaissance roles26. Although most likely modernized throughout the years, the older H-6 
bombers means that in the case of conflict China lacks a true strategic bombing capability that 
could penetrate enemy air defenses. In this sense, they lack a key capability that the United 
States possesses. Another key area in which the PLAAF lags behind America is in their fighter 
aircraft. While China has made vast qualitative improvements to their air force, even their most 
advanced fighter aircraft are not of the same quality as their western counterparts. China’s 
current indigenous stealth fighter, the J-20, is considered technologically inferior to other 
nations’ stealth aircraft. Instead of being seen as a true “gen 5” fighter aircraft, the J-20 is seen as 
“gen 4.5” aircraft, meaning that although it possesses relative stealth capabilities it still lacks 
advanced avionics and combat systems27. In addition to this, China is currently working on a 
more advanced stealth fighter known as the J-31, though that project remains in its prototype 
stage. Despite its shortcomings, China’s first stealth fighter is a massive step considering China 
could not design and produce their own modern aircraft just thirty years prior. As such, while the 
PLAAF still lacks some key capabilities that other modern air forces have. Regardless, the 
modernizations they have undergone and the new capabilities they have acquired show a clear 
trajectory towards turning their air force into a truly modern organization capable of 
sophisticated multi-domain operations.  
 
 Considering their raw destructive power and deterrent capabilities, it should come as no 
surprise that China has considerably modernized and enhanced their nuclear forces as well. The 
PRC has pursued advances in a variety of capabilities related to strategic nuclear weapons, 
including plans to create a true nuclear triad. A nuclear triad, for those who are not familiar, is 
the usage of ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines in order to ensure 
maximum deterrent capabilities. The logic behind such a concept is that each of the three 
delivery mechanisms possess different capabilities, and their continued existence ensures a 
second-strike capability. While ballistic missiles allow for the quickest action, strategic nuclear 
bombers allow for more accurate strikes, while ballistic missile submarines ensure that there is 
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constantly a nuclear arsenal roaming the high seas that is concealed by the ocean’s depths. 
China’s has made advances in every branch of the nuclear triad, though as mentioned earlier 
their strategic bomber capabilities are still lagging behind those of other triad-equipped nations. 
With regards to ballistic missile development, China’s capabilities are considered incredibly 
capable. The 2019 Missile Defense Review claimed China’s ballistic missile development 
program was, “one of the most active and diverse…programs in the world”28. Currently, it is 
estimated that China has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, with some being used in a road-mobile 
system that gives an extra level of spontaneity as to the location of potential launch sites. China 
currently possesses four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), giving the PRC the ability 
to “hide” a portion of their nuclear arsenal at sea. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
this figure is expected to grow to a total of eight SSBNs by 2030, signaling a large increase in 
their nuclear deterrent capabilities29. As for the strategic bomber aspect of the nuclear triad, 
while the outdated H-6 is unlikely to be able to penetrate enemy air defenses, China is currently 
developing an air launched ballistic missile (ALBM) which would give the aging airframe the 
ability to launch nuclear weapons from a standoff distance30. Additionally, it is expected that 
China will increase the total number of nuclear warheads in their arsenal within the near future. 
The DOD estimates that their current nuclear arsenal will double within the next decade31. This 
makes nuclear weapons one of the few areas in which China’s advancements over the past thirty 
years has been characterized by both qualitative and quantitative improvements.  
 
While China has drastically increased the quality and quantity of their nuclear weapons, it 
would not be accurate to paint their nuclear weapons buildup as something remotely similar in 
scale to the nuclear arms races of the Cold War era, the only other nuclear great power 
competition. The estimated doubling of China’s nuclear arsenal would put their total at around 
200 nuclear warheads. While the destructive capability of such a quantity of weapons is 
immense, it is still a small quantity of nuclear weapons when compared to both America and 
Russia/Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpiles. Current estimates place America’s nuclear stockpile at 
around 5,800 warheads, with Russia currently holding 6,375 in their inventory32. So, it seems 
logical that although China has increased their nuclear weapons in both quality and quantity, 
they are not undertaking the same sort of rapid dyadic buildup in nuclear weapons that the 
characterized the dynamic between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. It can be 
theorized that China’s reasons for increasing their nuclear capabilities is based on prestige, as 
there is undeniably a sense of national pride in having a functional nuclear triad. The acquisition 
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of such a set of capabilities can also be attributed to defense and deterrence, due to the triad’s 
ability to ensure second strike capabilities in the event of a nuclear conflict. Overall, China’s 
investments into nuclear weapons does not seem to mirror those that characterized the previous 
great power competition. Additionally, their reasoning for doing so can be attributed to several of 
Gray’s (1974) rationales.  
 In addition to the increasingly advanced materiel acquired by the Chinese military, a 
variety of new information systems technology has been developed and fielded by the PLA and 
its related branches. The reorganization of the PLA in 1993 laid the groundwork for China’s 
investment in advanced information sharing systems for military purposes. The lessons learned 
from the Gulf War, primarily the need for information sharing systems on the battlefield, 
motivated Chinese military officials to increase investments in such capabilities. One Chinese 
official was quoted as saying the following, “the Gulf War was a high-technology local war . . . 
[that] shows that the development of high technology is the ‘dragon’s head’ [longtou] of national 
defense and economic development”33. It should come as no surprise then that the Chinese 
military has placed a large emphasis on developing technologies that are meant to control the 
flow of information both in and outside of combat.  
China’s current usage of information sharing technologies on the battlefield is meant to 
follow the trend of being able to fight under increasingly “informatized” conditions, which 
means “dismantling adversary information systems and also possessing superior capabilities”34. 
There are a variety of different systems that can allow for such capabilities. And indeed, it seems 
that China has invested much time and money into developing an array of such systems in order 
to control the flow of information on the modern battlefield. One such example is the 
implementation of 5G networks to allow for the faster transfer of large amounts of data between 
sensors and programs meant to synthesize and analyze the data. The PLA is also investing in 
several integrated command systems meant to allow for the fast transfer of data between military 
assets, essentially creating tools for what the PLA calls an “intelligentized” command and 
decision-making routine35.  
That being said, China’s vast investments in information technology is not purely meant 
to counter adversaries on the battlefield. Massive amounts of data harvesting from civilian 
devices, along with robust national censorship capabilities, gives the Chinese government a 
strong grip on the flow of information to their entire populace. As such, they can easily shape 
narratives surrounding certain events. Such efforts are not purely confined to Chinese corners of 
the internet. It is well established that China leverages so called “discourse power” in order to 
shape global conversations surrounding various issues. This is primarily accomplished through 
the use of paid trolls to spread pro-China sentiment. A description of these efforts is as follows, 
“…the CCP employs the wumao dang or “50 Cent Party” to spread positive sentiments about the 
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CCP. The 50 Cent Party so far seems composed of real human people that react to anti-CCP 
online content by flooding the comments with pro-PRC sentiment”36. While such practices are 
not strictly military in nature, the fact that they are used by the Chinese government in order to 
control information and narratives in order to shape the strategic landscape in their favor has dire 
implications for great power competitions. Such a trend has not gone unnoticed by American 
defense officials. A 2020 DOD report on China’s military power mentions these so called 
“influence operations” as key tools in China’s strategic playbook, “The PRC conducts influence 
operations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic objectives by targeting cultural 
institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United 
States, other countries, and international institutions”37. As information becomes increasingly 
digitized and decentralized, the ability to craft narratives and push propaganda through 
cyberspace becomes increasingly easier and more effective and can certainly be used by 
governments in order to accomplish a variety of strategic objectives.  
China’s overall push towards greater control of information sharing is not surprising to 
those who know their overarching strategic goals; however, that does not make these capabilities 
any less potent or dangerous to adversaries. Having the ability to seamlessly share information 
on the battlefield between a variety of different assets gives China an ability that is seen as 
essential for any modern military. Additionally, it is clear that China’s investment and 
production of these systems was spurred by their observations of the First Gulf War and 
subsequent fear that the PLA would be unable to counter a modern military on the battlefield, 
fitting Gray’s (1974) definition of this being a change in military capabilities motivated by the 
rationale of technology. It is now apparent that China has the mastery of these capabilities within 
their reach, and they are willing to employ a variety of means in order to control the flow of 
information both on the battlefield and among a civilian populace.  
 Overall, while China’s armed forces are still not as capable as the United States military, 
they have made massive strides in modernization over the past thirty years and are quickly 
moving towards being able to effectively counter American forces in the South Pacific region. 
Their push towards “local wars under high-technology conditions” as elaborated by Fravel 
(2019) is clearly evident in their current force structure and capabilities. Despite the fact that they 
are not leading the field in certain areas, even top American officials admit that China may 
currently be classified as a near-peer competitor.  
 
The PLA of today is an entirely different force than the PLA of three decades past, and 
their wariness of the United States and the West has clearly motivated them to modernize their 
armed forces and acquire capabilities that allow for them to better control their strategic 
environment. It is apparent from their various modernizations that China has pursued a primarily 
qualitative increase in arms, mainly focusing on acquiring new capabilities rather than the 
numerical size of their military. Additionally, one may be inclined to say that China is motivated 
by several of the rationales Gray (1974) established as motivators for arms buildups. Of these 
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seven, I believe that one can make the claim that China is motivated by technology, diplomacy, 
deterrence, and defense (if not tangentially a few others). In the case of technology, it is clear 
that China’s perception of America as a more technologically advanced nation thirty years ago 
spurred massive investments into sophisticated technologies meant to optimize their control of 
information. As for diplomacy, it seems clear based on China’s actions that they intend to use 
their newfound military dominance in order to increase their diplomatic influence. One such 
example of this dynamic in action can be said to be China’s actions in the South China Sea, 
which entail using their naval assets in order to stake claims to waters that do not fall into the 
PRC’s jurisdiction in accordance with international law. The usage of such intimidation tactics is 
possibly meant to bully less powerful nations into respecting China’s illegitimate claims. In the 
case of the defense rationale as a possible explanation for China’s military modernization, I 
believe the evidence is clear. Based off of Taylor Fravel’s Active Defense (2019), it is apparent 
that China believed the PLA to be ill-equipped to fight a modern war in the age of technology. 
Taking lessons from the coalition in the Gulf War, China reformed their defense strategies in 
order to better prevent defeat in case they enter conflict with a more technologically advanced 
nation. As Fravel notes, “China lacked the sophisticated technology that was seen as enhancing a 
state’s military power and was, therefore, increasingly vulnerable”38. Overall, it is clear that the 
PRC’s vast military modernization efforts were primarily meant to counter America’s advanced 
capabilities and ensure that the PLA becomes a world-class military.  
 
 America’s responses to these advancements in Chinese capabilities have been mostly 
strategic in nature. Additionally, these changes were enacted far later in time than China’s 
original 1993 shift towards a more modern military. In fact, it was not until 2018 that the United 
States issued an official national defense strategy that outlined the new ways in which they 
aimed to counter China. The strategy outlined in the document closely mirrored what China has 
been focusing on for the past thirty years, that being advanced multi-domain capabilities. The 
national defense strategy notes the fact that it was only until recently that America enjoyed 
relatively uncontested dominance of every domain, whether that be air, sea, or land39. It is certain 
from the summary of the 2018 national defense strategy that the American military realizes that 
their technological supremacy is in jeopardy. The strategy outlines a variety of measures meant 
to further enhance the capabilities of the U.S. military.  
 
 One such goal is the modernization of key capabilities within the armed forces. Said 
capabilities include nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR (command, control, computers 
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile defense, enhanced joint combat 
capabilities, forward operations, autonomous systems, and resilient and agile logistics40. Each of 
these capabilities are seen as key in order to maintain relevance in an increasingly advanced and 
multi-domain combat environment and are intended to help with the overall goal of building a 
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“more lethal force” in the words of the national defense strategy. A number of these listed 
capabilities have been areas in which China has invested large amounts of resources, notably the 
emphasis on multi-domain combat capabilities and information systems. It seems that these 
specific needs for advancement on part of the Americans has been triggered by an increase in an 
adversary’s competence in the same fields. Indeed, China’s increasing abilities is mentioned in 
the summary as a key threat to the global strategic environment in the eyes of the American 
military. “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory 
economics to coerce its neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their 
advantage”41. That being said, it should be noted that the national defense strategy was drafted in 
response to a variety of strategic threats on the global stage, not just China’s increasing relative 
power. Russian aggression and transnational terror organizations are also named as key threats to 
global security. Still, it should be noted that many of the fields listed in the national defense 
strategy as key to modernize are those that China has heavily invested resources into over the 
past thirty years, as elaborated upon earlier. From America’s recent strategic declarations, it is 
apparent that they are pursuing a strategy of qualitative improvements to their armed in order to 
increase their relative power on the global stage.   
 
 Despite this, America has also recently undertaken a quantitative increase in arms to try 
and offset the numerical advantage China enjoys on the ocean. The U.S. Navy’s 2020 fiscal year 
shipbuilding plan outlines an ambitious effort to drastically increase the size of America’s fleet. 
The plan aims to increase the total size of America’s Navy to 355 ships by 2034, for reference 
the current size of the fleet is roughly 290 ships42. Such a drastic increase in size requires an 
equally drastic increase in funding. The 2020 plan for shipbuilding requires a 50% increase in 
funding over the average, making such a plan incredibly costly for taxpayers. That being said, it 
may be necessary in order to combat China’s growing maritime capabilities. Considering the 
nature of any hypothetical conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, much of the action would take 
place at sea. Although China’s industrial shipbuilding capacity is said to be far greater than 
America’s, an increase in the overall size of the United States’ Navy is seen as necessary in order 
to have a chance to cling to their dominance in the region.  
 
 It is apparent that America intends to pursue two different types of tactics in order to 
counter China’s increase in capabilities. The first is a qualitative increase in the American 
military, which is characterized by investments in advancing capabilities and increasing multi-
domain functionality. The second such strategy is a massive increase in total fleet size, a clear 
quantitative oriented investment. Though the fact that America is pursuing these strategies nearly 
thirty years after China began an aggressive force modernization program may confuse some. 
This begs this question, why has the United States waited until relatively recently to undergo a 
somewhat similar operation?  
 
 
41Summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the United States of America: sharpening the American 
military's competitive edge § (n.d.). 
 




 One explanation I put forward is that until recently, America’s threat perception of China 
was relatively low, though not non-existent. This assumption on behalf of the Americans would 
not be unreasonable. As previously shown in the chart sourced from the Congressional Research 
Service, China’s overall fleet size was not larger than America’s until 2015. Considering the 
increasingly advanced quality of the weapons systems that China was beginning to acquire at 
roughly the same time, it does not seem unreasonable that the scope of China’s capabilities was 
not fully realized until years after their ambitious military modernization efforts were underway. 
The fact that at a bureaucratic level, American policymakers would not be aware of China’s 
capabilities is far more likely than many would think, and there have been multiple occasions 
where U.S. analysts were surprised at the speed of China’s indigenous weapons advancements. A 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report noted a variety 
of difficulties that American researchers faced when attempting to study Chinese weapons 
development. The secrecy of the PRC, underestimation of China’s industrial capacity, 
misconceptions of Chinese national security policymaking, and underestimations of China’s 
perception of the threat America poses were all mentioned as reasons American analysts have 
potentially understated or miscalculated the true extent of China’s capabilities43. Accordingly, if 
American policymakers did not appreciate the extent of China’s qualitative advances, it seems 
rational that their threat perception of the Chinese military would be relatively low. And, as is 
standard in the case of arms races, the feeling of threat caused by reduced relative power should 
spur a corresponding increase in the acquisition of military capabilities. As such, in the absence 
of such a feeling, it would seem likely that America would not invest in cultivating increasingly 
advanced military equipment until they felt their relative power position decrease as a result of 
China’s emerging power. The drastic difference in defense spending between the two nations 
would further reinforce the idea that America has a drastic advantage over China. America’s 
military budget has consistently been above $400 billion since the turn of the century, peaking at 
almost $850 billion in 2010, while last measured at $718 billion for the 2019 fiscal year44. 
China’s defense budget, on the other hand, has consistently remained lower. While the PRC’s 
defense budget has maintained an almost constant upward trajectory since the year 2000, it tops 
out at $261 billion, a considerably lower figure than America’s defense expenditures. However, 
it was recently noted in the 2020 DOD review on China’s military power that the Chinese 
government severely understates their defense spending by omission of several key areas of 
investment45, making the suspicion that American military officials were mistakenly mislead by 
China’s comparatively low defense spending unlikely. 
 
 Another possible explanation for America’s seeming lack of targeted responses to 
China’s advancements is that they have been preoccupied with other global strategic threats. The 
past twenty years has seen America embroiled in several sustained low-intensity conflicts in the 
Middle East, with the goal of subduing global terror networks. The post-9/11 Global War on 
 
43 U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission. Indigenous Weapons Development in China's Military 
Modernization, 2012. 
 
44 Duffin, Erin, and Jun 2. “U.S. Military Spending 2019.” Statista, June 2, 2020. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272473/us-military-spending-from-2000-to-2012/.  
 
45Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (pp. 1-173, Rep.). (2020). 
Department of Defense. 
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Terror shifted massive amounts of military resources to prolonged anti-insurgency campaigns, 
taking the spotlight away from China’s plans in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, Russia’s 
increasing aggression in Europe has forced America to reconfirm its commitment to its NATO 
allies through a greater focus on European strategic cooperation since the 2014 invasion of the 
Crimean Peninsula by Russian forces. It can be argued that it was not until recently that China 
took the spot as the hot button foreign policy issue for American politicians. Whether this is due 
to the global community paying closer attention to China’s unfounded territorial claims, or 
American anxiety about their decreasing relative power position is unclear. It is definitely 
possible that it is a mix of a variety of factors. In any case, such an explanation for why America 
only recently shifted towards explicitly countering China would take into account Gray’s (1974) 
rationale of functional threat, in which the current “target” of policymakers is being used to 
justify an increase in arms procurement due to their potential threat to the state’s power. This is 
not to say that America didn’t view China as a threat to their strategic interests until recently, but 
that America’s perception of the threat China posed was not fully realized until after China’s 
military buildup and a series of aggressive interactions on the world stage. Additionally, 
America’s lack of early response to China’s military modernization campaign may be seen as 
rational through the lens of Gray’s (1974) theory, since the fact that America did not view 
China’s military as a near-peer adversary at the time meant that the PLA was not viewed as a 
threat to America’s defense or strategic resources in the region.  
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 While the past thirty years has seen China engage in a massive modernization of their 
armed forces, the United States did not begin to respond to their arms buildup until relatively 
recently. Considering each nation has undergone both qualitative and quantitative increases in 
arms over the given timeframe, it seems apparent that Huntington’s (1958) hypothesis on the 
multidimensionality of arms races holds true for this case. Given this, one may also say that 
America’s recent push towards quantitative increases (as seen with their fleet acquisition plans) 
may signal preparation for conflict with China, given Huntington’s speculation that a pivot from 
qualitative to quantitative arms buildup may precede such an event. However, predominant 
views of arms races between great powers (such as those seen during the Cold War) seem to not 
apply well to this case, given the relatively low intensity of the dyadic relationship between 
America and China’s arms buildups. This is even more clear in the case of their respective 
nuclear arsenals. While China is increasing the number of their nuclear warheads, and attempting 
to create a nuclear triad, we have yet to see a true dyadic nuclear arms race between the two 
powers. It seems then, that in the case of U.S.-China, a state that is increasing its relative power 
position on the world stage may not necessarily evoke a strong response from the current global 
hegemony until they reach a point at which their military capabilities present a threat to the 
existing world order. America’s responses to China’s military buildup seem to confirm this, 
given that they were mostly undertaken relatively recently, and in response to increased Chinese 
aggression in the Indo-Pacific region that threatens to put American strategic interests at risk. 
Additionally, my findings support Gray’s (1974) views on certain rationales as being the drivers 
behind arms races. Overall, while there are shortcomings in the applicability of certain 
theoretical frameworks on arms races for this case, the general trend still follows the framework 
laid out in many of the basic theories on arms buildups.  
 
 There are many lessons policymakers can learn from the information provided from the 
analysis. One example of this is a greater understanding of how states will react to other states 
when there is a large gap in relative power. America’s late response to China’s military 
modernization shows how a state may not perceive another state undergoing large adaptations in 
military capabilities as a threat until the capabilities that have been acquired pose a threat to their 
relative power position. Additionally, insights as to what specific actions are believed to 
motivate reactions that lead to the dynamics of a dyadic arms race. Acknowledging that a state 
that perceives a certain action or situation as a threat may guide policymakers to attempt to avoid 
such incidents as to not run the risk of provoking an arms race. Additionally, one can see what 
actions further provoke arms races, or what sort of reactions are thought to signal preparation for 
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conflict. Knowing such things can be a great asset for policymakers and can further enhance their 
decision-making capabilities.  
 
 The case analysis also provides specific lessons for policy regarding future U.S.-China 
relations. One such lesson may be that the current trend of drastically increasing America’s total 
fleet size may signal that the United States is preparing for conflict, and should policymakers 
wish to adopt a less aggressive stance towards China and hope for a decrease in their arms 
buildup they may want to slow down the rate at which America’s navy expands. On the other 
hand, China’s continuous modernization of their military can be interpreted as being motivated 
by diplomacy or prestige, in which case they will continue to undergo a buildup in arms so long 
as America maintains a greater position of relative power.  
 
 In short, there are a myriad of lessons policymakers can learn from the presented case. 
Theories on arms races and their consequences guide many of these decisions and being able to 
ensure that real world examples conform to certain literary predictions lends credibility to their 
legitimacy. Additionally, examining a prominent case of an arms race and seeing which 
theoretical frameworks are further confirmed by real-world occurrences strengthens the 
foundations of the arms race literature.  
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